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This dissertation is an examination into the evolution of Britain‟s airborne forces 
during World War Two and their participation in two of the most contentious 
battles that they were involved in, Operations Market Garden and Varsity.  These 
airborne operations were mired in controversy at the time and have remained so 
ever since.  The 1st Airborne Division was reduced to a fragment of its once 
proud self after only nine days at Arnhem.  Yet Arnhem is not a battle that should 
be examined in isolation.  The major airborne operation that followed it, the Rhine 
crossing in March 1945, was also extremely controversial as a result of the 
considerable losses suffered by the 6th Airborne Division.  The two battles are not 
separate actions; they form a continuous sequence in comprehending the 
development of airborne experience within the British military by war‟s end.  An 
examination of the expansion of airborne forces from their earliest days provides 
a degree of illumination as to why the events at Arnhem and Hamminkeln 
transpired as they did.   
 
 
The desire to create such a force was a far from seamless process and many 
issues emerged, some of which continued to influence events right until the end 
of the war.  Clausewitz‟s famous dictum, that “the practice of war is uncertain and 
much subject to human error” fits perfectly the history of British airborne forces 
between 1940 and 1945.  In attempting to create such a force during wartime 
conditions, many mistakes were invariably made and many compromises were 
required.  It is the comprehension of these mistakes and compromises that 
enables a much deeper understanding of the events that took place at Arnhem 
and the reasons for its eventual failure.  This in turn leads to much more acute 















During 1944 and 1945, the British use of airborne troops in World War Two 
reached its peak.  On several occasions, thousands of troops were delivered to 
battle by parachute or glider, along with all their weapons and equipment.  Since 
Britain possessed no parachute or glider troops at all in 1939, such complex and 
demanding operations demonstrated how far the airborne concept had come in a 
very short space of time.  Even two years into the war, Britain would have been 
unable to deliver a tenth of the number who landed at Arnhem or Hamminkeln 
just a few short years later.  The first British parachute operation, taking place in 
February 1941 in Italy (Operation Colossus), contained just 35 men.  In June 
1944, an entire airborne division was landed in two lifts as part of D-Day.  By 
March 1945 an entire airborne division was landed in one lift in just over an hour.  
It was a remarkable growth in capability for a brand new arm of the military.  
 
Yet if Operations Market Garden and Varsity represented the sheer potency of 
the Allied airborne concept and also symbolised their industrial might, the 
considerable numbers of troops who fought (and in many cases died, were 
wounded or captured) camouflages the fact that this form of warfare, even in 
1945, was still in its relative infancy.  A new „rule book‟ had had to be written for 
their use as none existed prior to war commencing and the harsh lessons that 
were learned often came at a bloody and painful price.  While airborne forces 
have now become a recognised part of most developed countries‟ armed forces, 
their creation within Britain‟s in 1940 was an entirely novel concept.    None of 
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Britain‟s most senior wartime commanders had any previous knowledge of or 
exposure to airborne forces.  They simply had to adjust themselves to the new 
„modus operandi‟ of this novel form of warfare and the notion of „vertical 
envelopment‟.  As a result, such troops were not always used in the most 
effective fashion1, even in the latter stages of the war, and historians continue to 
argue the merits of plans and decisions to this day.   
 
The Allied airborne operations for Market Garden in September 1944 and Varsity 
in March 1945, in which the British 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions played such 
significant roles, saw the biggest combat use of parachute and air-landing forces 
that the world has ever seen.  They were monumental in their undertaking and 
variously involved British, American, Polish and Canadian troops landing in the 
very heart of enemy territory.  However, both remain surrounded by controversy 
to an extent not visited upon that other large Allied airborne operation, D-Day.  
The 1st Airborne Division was effectively destroyed during the nine days of battle 
at Arnhem in September 1944, losing nearly fifteen hundred2 men killed or 
wounded.  The casualty rate within the 6th Airborne Division during Operation 
Varsity in March 1945 was extremely high, with well over a thousand men killed, 
wounded or missing after only one day.  Indeed, several prominent post-war 
military historians, among them Sir Max Hastings, challenge whether Varsity was 
necessary at all. 
                                                 
1
 Sometimes even commanders within airborne forces were guilty of making poor decisions.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Chatterton, commanding the Glider Pilot Regiment in 1943, was appalled at the suggestions made 
by Major-General Hopkinson, then commanding 1
st
 Airborne Division, for the Sicily invasion yet was told 
in no uncertain terms if he didn’t comply he would be replaced immediately. 
2
 1,485 fatal casualties according to Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944,Tthe Airborne Battle  (Pen & 
Sword, Barnsley, 2009), p.439 
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It is against such a backdrop of sacrifice and bloodshed that this work examines 
the concepts that developed and evolved for the effective use of British airborne 
formations during World War Two.  It then examines in detail the factors that 
affected the 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions during their respective actions, each of 
which were vast in scope and groundbreaking in their use of airborne troops.  
Indeed, the spectacle of watching so many aircraft and gliders transport the 
entire 6th and 17th Airborne Divisions to the eastern bank of the Rhine in March 
1945 for Operation Varsity was something which convinced one young German 
soldier “that we could not win the war.”3  
 
However, the question was then, and remains to this day, whether or not the 
commitment of a British airborne division to battle at Arnhem and the Rhine 
crossing was a justifiable use of their particular talents or a squandering of some 
of Britain‟s premier fighting troops.  Immense logistical resources and highly 
detailed planning were required to launch parachute and glider troops to battle in 
this fashion and arguments have raged ever since about the losses suffered 
compared to the benefits gained.  Only by evaluating the experience of both 
battles is it possible to determine whether the concepts, plans, expectations and 





                                                 
3
 Clark, Arnhem, (Headline, London, 2008), p. 302 
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Chapter I. The Concept And Evolution Of Britain’s Airborne Forces. 
 
The British airborne forces that fought at Arnhem and Hamminkeln were the 
product of all the events and experiences that had affected military parachuting 
and gliding, both in Britain and elsewhere, since May 1940.  Events, mistakes, 
support, lack of cooperation, successes and failures all helped to shape the 
evolution of the airborne arm and directly led to the policies and procedures 
adopted by the last year of the war.  Consequently, in order to fully understand 
these two aforementioned battles, one must also comprehend the concepts at 
the heart of the airborne „raison d‟être.‟  These include the developments that 
affected them, the quantity of weapons, ammunition and equipment transported 
to battle, issues surrounding glider pilots and tug crews, the attitude of RAF 
commanders, the aircraft used for airborne and resupply operations and even the 
speed and methods by with which troops could be rallied on the Dropping or 
Landing Zones (DZs and LZs).   
 
To do otherwise is to miss seemingly trivial yet actually essential issues, all of 
which contribute to a greater comprehension of the state of British airborne 
forces in 1944 and 1945, how they undertook the tasks allocated to them and 
ultimately why events transpired as they did.  These are not always given due 
weight in historical accounts, yet an account of Operations Market Garden and 
Varsity is incomplete without them.  Some had far-reaching consequences that 
still resonated in September 1944 and March 1945.  
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The evolution of British airborne forces and the concepts that guided their use 
were more the product of compromises, especially regarding the RAF, than that 
of a vision which matured untouched by change.  Airborne forces were (and still 
are) one of the most complex and expensive means of launching troops into 
battle.  Furthermore, each separate arm of the airborne force, paratroops, glider 
pilots and airlanding troops, developed its own methods and concepts, some of 
which were realised at considerable cost.  This was especially the case with the 
gliders that were used.  These were then woven together to form a whole that 
could be used for operations. Lastly, it is only possible to understand the 
effectiveness of Britain‟s airborne forces if one understands the strengths and 
weaknesses of the key items of equipment used.   
 
Such troops contributed greatly to the national war effort during World War Two, 
fighting in almost all theatres where British land forces fought.  Along the way, 
they suffered thousands of dead and wounded.4  In addition, many hundreds 
more aircrew and dispatchers were lost in RAF transport and resupply aircraft.  
Commonwealth War Grave Cemeteries across all of Europe, North Africa and 
elsewhere bear silent witness to their commitment.  The name famously given to 
British paratroops by the Germans they fought in North Africa, „Die Röte Teufeln‟ 
(the Red Devils), was won on the battlefield and was a measure of their fighting 
prowess. 
 
                                                 
4
  Nearly 8,500 airborne soldiers were killed or wounded during WW2.  Statistics from G Norton, The Red 
Devils; From Bruneval to the Falklands,  (Leo Cooper, London, 1984) p.299 
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The origin of all British airborne forces can be traced back to Churchill‟s 
memorandum to General Hastings Ismay, his Chief Military Assistant, on 22 June 
1940, asking for “a corps of at least five thousand parachute troops” to be raised.    
He wrote, “I hear something is being done already to form such a corps but only, 
I believe, on a very small scale … Pray let me have a note from the War Office 
on the subject.”5  However, Britain was not strongly placed to develop airborne 
forces at all in 1940 and any desires to create such an arm ran headlong into the 
hugely daunting and incontestable facts that there was no experience, no 
equipment, no facilities to train airborne soldiers and no dedicated aircraft to 
transport them.     
 
Britain had disregarded the creation of an airborne force prior to 1939.  Several 
other nations, particularly the Russians, embraced the concept.  They pioneered 
the use of paratroops and were the first nation to use them in combat.6  General 
Archibald Wavell, then head of the British Military Delegation watching the Red 
Army military exercises of 1936, observed a mass descent by some 1,200 
Russian soldiers, including eighteen light field guns and over one hundred 
machine guns.  He wrote that “if I had not witnessed the descents I could not 
have believed such a thing possible.”7  Nevertheless, such developments excited 
little interest in the upper ranks of the British military or the War Office.  This was 
                                                 
5
 HMSO, By Air To Battle, (HMSO, London, 1945)  p. 7 
6
 Soviet paratroops were first used in combat in 1929, when fifteen men were parachuted in to the besieged 
town of Gharm in present day Tajikistan to reinforce Soviet troops being attacked by Basmachi fighters.  
Small numbers (often of several dozen) were dropped during the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish war but met 
with varying degrees of success.  The drop at Petsamo in northern Finland on 02 December 1939, during 
the opening stages of the war, was typical of such an approach.  The entire parachuting force was 
destroyed, many being killed in descent. 
7
 HMSO, By Air To Battle, p.8 
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due partly to the feeling that “there was little scope for the employment of 
airborne forces on a scale sufficient to exert any major influence on a campaign 
or battle” and partly due to financial issues “which discouraged expenditure on 
apparently rather fantastic new ideas.”8  
 
Even during the final years of peace, when Germany was developing her own 
paratroops and glider forces at a rapid pace, Britain continued to disregard any 
notion of such developments.  Parachutes remained the exclusive preserve of 
aircrew and aerial daredevils and gliders were for civilian sporting use only.  It 
was the German use of paratroops and glider troops during their invasion of 
Western Europe in May and June 1940 that highlighted to Britain‟s military and 
political leaders just how potent and effective such forces could be, if used 
appropriately.   
 
In particular, it was the capture of the supposedly impregnable Belgian fort of 
Eben Emael on 10-11 May 1940 that dramatically underlined their potential on 
the battlefield.  This successful attack saw seventy eight glider-borne troops 
overpower more than a thousand Belgian soldiers to capture the fortress.  
However, the Air Ministry was not slow in pointing to the failure of German 
parachute troops at Dombås in Norway and at Ypenburg airfield in Holland and 
expressed the opinion “that it was at least possible that this was the last time that 
parachute troops are used on a serious scale in major operations.”9  Churchill, 
                                                 
8
 Terence Otway, The Second World War, 1939-1945, Army, Airborne Forces, (HMSO, London, 1951) p3 
9
 Ibid p. 22 
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only recently appointed as Prime Minister, was adamant that a British airborne 
force would be raised.   
 
It was he who provided much of the impetus during the early days of 1940 and 
1941 for a similar force to be raised by Britain.  His note set in motion the 
development of British airborne forces that was later to play such a major part in 
the war effort.  However, this came at a time when the creation of such an 
offensively-minded force was largely irrelevant.  The most pressing need, 
certainly in the apprehensive atmosphere after Dunkirk, was for defensive forces.  
In June 1940, a sizeable portion of the British army had only just been evacuated 
from the continent, where it had left most of its heavy equipment behind.  The 
most immediate need was for all available manpower to reorganise and prepare 
to defend against possible Nazi invasion.  This also required the urgent replacing 
of the vast quantities of equipment which had been left behind in France and 
Belgium.  This fact, combined with the fact that industry was still moving towards 
a war footing, meant that shortages were the order of the day for all Services.  
Consequently, the development of an airborne force was extremely protracted 
during this period. 
 
Furthermore, and most importantly of all, there was no policy as to how the 
proposed parachute force was to be used.  Three different options seemed 
available at the time.  They could be used for raids and be evacuated by air or 
sea or saboteurs could be parachuted in.  All options were a long way from the 
5,000 men Churchill envisaged and the numbers under discussion were between 
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100 and 500 parachute troops.  It was, however, all that could be realistically 
delivered with the resources then available.   
 
Ultimately, arguments about resources “revolved around the simple fact that 
airborne troops were more easily produced than pilots and aircraft.”10  From this 
simple statement sprang two main issues that affected airborne troops 
throughout most of the war and were directly attributable to the RAF.  First, the 
lack of enthusiasm within the highest echelons of the RAF led to problems with 
the provision of enough aircraft for dropping paratroops and towing gliders.  
Second, the lack of a dedicated transport aircraft, suitable for dropping 
paratroops and towing gliders, created significant problems. 
 
Watching a demonstration on 16 April, 1942, Churchill saw the entire fleet of 
aircraft then available to airborne forces, twelve obsolete Whitley bombers for the 
paratroops and nine Hector aircraft, each towing a Hotspur glider.  It was a fairly 
dismal indication of the RAF‟s attitude and involvement.  This attitude continued 
to cast a shadow on all airborne planning between 1941 and early 1944.  It 
provoked much discourse between the Air Ministry, Downing Street and the War 
Office, was central to the slow build up of airborne forces and dominated the use 
and effectiveness of all Britain‟s airborne troops at that time.  
  
                                                 
10
 Victor Dover, The Sky Generals,  (Cassell, London, 1981) p.108 
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Yet, even in April 1942, an Air Ministry report confirmed the “we cannot afford to 
have learners on either end of the two rope”11 and that pilots and crews for tug 
aircraft should be provided, in order that there should be no delays or lack of 
experience in transporting gliders to battle.  However, just how dire a situation 
still existed, in spite of the Air Ministry‟s report, was firmly indicated during the 
Dieppe raid of August 1942.  The planning had originally included 1st Parachute 
Battalion but such was the lack of aircraft that two squadrons from Bomber 
Command had to be brought in at the final stages to enable the troops to be 
lifted.  Fortuitously, their part in the raid was cancelled at the last minute, whilst 
waiting for take off. 
 
The RAF‟s position was straightforward to understand, even if it revealed a 
blinkered and unimaginative approach to the contribution airborne forces could 
make to the war effort.  Between 1940 and 1943, the RAF‟s focus had been 
initially on fighters for defence, then bombers for attack and other aircraft to help 
combat the submarine threat.  Using highly trained bomber crews to drop 
paratroops and tow gliders was viewed as wasteful.  In late 1942, Sir Charles 
Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, summed up the RAF‟s position by stating that “the 
bombing of German industry was an incomparably greater contribution to the war 
than the training and constant availability of the airborne division.”12  Senior 
officers such as Portal and Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief Bomber 
Command from February 1942, believed that converting bomber crews to drop 
paratroops or tow gliders would take only some few hours training.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
11
 Claude Smith, History of the Glider Pilot Regiment (GPR), (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2009), p. 27 
12
 Otway, Airborne Forces, p. 60 
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Harris believed that airborne operations were not a practical method of war and 
had little faith in them, regarding them as “vulnerable”, “restricted” and a “drain on 
aircraft and aircrews.”13  He argued that casualties could potentially be 
enormous, that the weather in Europe was generally unsuitable for parachuting 
and that only limited numbers of paratroops (one brigade‟s worth) could be 
carried.  In his opinion, using Bomber aircraft to transport airborne soldiers would 
“cripple Bomber Command.”14 
  
The focus on heavy bomber raids intensified as the war progressed and was, in 
truth, almost the only practical way to attack targets within Germany and 
occupied Europe for a large part of the war.  Yet this focus, to the exclusion of 
the activities of other services, did not endear Harris to other senior members of 
Britain‟s military or political leadership and certainly not within airborne circles.  
The complexities of the factors surrounding this issue were not lost on Churchill.  
Nevertheless, he realised that unless the RAF cooperated, Britain‟s airborne 
forces would remain limited in ability and effectiveness.  In January 1943, no less 
a personage than General Browning, then commander of 1st Airborne Division, 
was moved to comment that “there were only 48 aircraft available for dropping 
paratroops or towing gliders, none of which was capable of towing a fully-loaded 
Horsa.”15  Not pulling any punches, he added “Bomber Command display no 
interest and carry out no training in parachuting or towing.”16   What this meant in 
effect was that Britain‟s airborne forces were being forced to adopt a small-scale 
                                                 
13
 Dover, Sky Generals, p. 46 
14
 Ibid, p.60 
15
 The Horsa gilder was the main workhorse of the British glider force during World War Two, with nearly 
4000 built by 1945 and capable of carrying up to 25 fully armed troops. 
16
 Smith, History of the GPR, p. 42 
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raiding approach rather than the approach favoured by Browning and other 
airborne commanders, one where “their greatest importance lay in their power to 
attack the enemy in force on his open flank – over the top … [as part of] … a 
well-balanced force of all-arms concentrated on vital objectives.”17   
 
After complaints reached Churchill from elsewhere in early 194318, he informed 
Harris that the necessary aircraft for transportation of airborne troops must be 
found.  Still affected by the Dardanelles fiasco of 1915 and “the brilliant idea 
mucked up by bungling down the line”, he was determined “not to let ineptitude 
or bloody-mindedness at lower levels ruin audacious projects for a second 
time.”19  
 
Entrenched attitudes within the RAF notwithstanding, airborne transportation 
woes were often compounded by a genuine lack of suitable aircraft necessary to 
deliver the airborne troops.  This issue dogged airborne operations throughout 
the war and, even in 1945, only two airborne divisions were used for Operation 
Varsity rather than the three which were initially proposed.  This was solely due 
to not enough aircraft being available to drop three airborne divisions in one lift.   
 
                                                 
17
 Otway, Airborne Forces, p.51 
18
 Two members of the Glider Pilot Regiment, Staff Sgt Waldron and Major Willoughby, unknown to each 
other, made complaints to D N Pritt, MP and Vernon Bartlett (BBC war commentator) respectively, 
concerning the RAF’s failures to provide aircraft for glider training. 
19
 Martin Gilbert, In Search of Churchill, (Harper Collins, London, 1995), p. 186 
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It was the gradual introduction of the Douglas Dakota aircraft into RAF service 
from 1942 and especially the formation of 46 Group RAF20 in January 1944 
(being totally equipped with this aircraft)21 that marked a significant step forward 
for British, and indeed Allied, airborne forces.  Previous to the introduction of this 
aircraft, it was the almost exclusive preserve of former bombers to tow gliders 
and drop paratroops.  The Albemarle, Whitley and Halifax all played their 
respective roles in transporting airborne forces but could only drop ten 
paratroops each, with the Stirling able to drop twenty two men, all through a hole 
in the floor.  It was the Dakota‟s ability to tow a Horsa glider or drop up to twenty 
paratroops that made it the outstanding all-purpose transport aircraft of the war.   
 
Furthermore, the ability to jump through a door, rather than a hole, considerably 
speeded up the time taken to get all troops out of the aircraft, thereby increasing 
their chances of landing closer together.  The mass introduction of this aircraft, 
with some 2000 eventually entering RAF service, enabled large-scale airborne 
landings to truly become a realistic option.  Without it, “the scale of the Allies‟ 
airborne operations of 1944 and 1945 would have been impossible.”22 
  
What unequivocally highlighted the transportation issue once and for all and the 
pressing need for a solution was Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in 1943.  
The airborne attack that accompanied the invasion was the first time these forces 
had been used on such a scale by the Allies.  The events that transpired, 
                                                 
20
 38 Wing RAF was formed on 15 January 1942 from two squadrons.  In October 1943, it was 
substantially expanded and re-designated 38 (Airborne Force) Group RAF.  46 Group RAF was formed on 
17 January 1944 and flew transport operations as well as supporting airborne operations. 
21
 Previous to this, British airborne forces had used the Dakota but they were flown by the USAAF. 
22
 Smith, History of the GPR, p. 29 
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particularly the use of glider borne troops, was seen by some Allied commanders 
and politicians as extremely costly and little short of a disaster.  Indeed some 
commanders, Eisenhower among them, expressed grave reservations about the 
whole airborne concept.  He wrote to General Marshal, “I do not believe in the 
airborne division.”23  The reasons why were not difficult to see.  As far as all 
British airborne operations for Operations Husky were concerned, less than 10% 
of the gliders and only a third of the parachute aircraft dropped on or within half a 
mile of the target area.  Almost half the gliders used by the British during the 
initial invasion had landed in the sea24, with hundreds of men being drowned.   
 
Nevertheless, those airborne soldiers who had fought in Sicily had acquitted 
themselves well.  The reports written after the battle highlighted one factor above 
all, that airborne troops could not perform to the best of their ability unless the 
crews who transported them to battle performed to the best of theirs and landed 
them in sufficient strength at the right place and time.  The experience gained 
during the Sicily invasion made a mockery of Harris‟s statement of 22 August 
1941 that tug crews needed only several hours training to be able to drop 
paratroopers or tow gliders effectively.  Other senior Army officers also 
commented on this sorry state of affairs.  General Alexander, in his report on the 
Sicily invasion, commented that “the outstanding weakness in the [airborne] set-
up is the lack of trained air force pilots to transport them.  The RAF must produce 
                                                 
23
 Dover, Sky Generals, p. 76 
24
 Operation Ladbroke was the glider landings by 1
st
 Air Landing Brigade on 9/10 July 1943, in support of 
the main sea landings.  Out of 137 Waco and Horsa gliders that took off, sixty nine landed in the sea and 
only 12 landed in the correct area. 
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the pilots if we are to develop this arm ... Personally I firmly believe that …priority 
No.1 is for the airborne Corps.”25 
 
Even higher up the command chain, Field Marshal Sir John Dill26 commented on 
this issue in March 1944 when he wrote that “we are not fully exploiting our 
inherent airborne potential or capability”27 due, in part, to the lack of experienced 
airborne officers to help plan and coordinate airborne operations.  This issue, at 
least, had been fully rectified by the date of the Normandy landings.   
 
In a case of supreme irony, the airborne operations in Sicily were viewed by the 
Germans as pivotal to Allied success.   It was the same situation which had 
occurred after Crete in May 1941, only reversed.  Then, unaware of the scale of 
German losses, the British, and especially Churchill, had been impressed with 
the achievements of the German airborne troops and increased their own efforts 
in producing an airborne force.  Hitler, however, had been appalled at the cost 
and had determined never to use paratroops in such a fashion again.   
 
General Kurt Student, overall commander of German Fallschirmjäger 
(paratroops), wrote that “Allied airborne operations [in Sicily] were decisive, 
despite widely scattered drops” and was of the opinion that German 
reinforcements would have “driven the initial sea-borne landings back into the 
sea” had it not been for the long delays and large losses caused by the airborne 
                                                 
25
 ibid pp. 67-68 
26
 Then Senior British Representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington 
27
 Combined Chiefs of Staff Report 496,  Policy As To The Organisation and Employment Of Airborne 
Troops,  2
nd
 March 1944, p. 1 
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troops, especially those of the US 82nd Airborne Division.  This view was shared 
by Field Marshal Kesselring, overall German commander during this campaign.   
 
Regarding the parachute element of airborne forces, the concepts and 
techniques behind how to use British parachute forces most effectively 
developed as the war progressed.  Several issues affecting the development of 
an effective parachute force were instantly evident.  First, “everything had to be 
designed, worked out and built from the beginning.”28  Major John Rock was put 
in charge of the organisation of British airborne forces in June 1940 without “any 
information as to policy or task”29 and with a “damaged parachute and jumping 
helmet captured from the Germans”30 as inspiration for suitable parachuting 
equipment.  The situation with gliders was little different.  
 
The state of affairs was neatly summed up in 1940 by one senior RAF officer and 
is worth quoting in its entirety; 
“There are very real difficulties in this parachuting business.  We are trying to do 
what we have never done hitherto, namely to introduce a completely new arm 
into the Service at about five minutes notice, and with totally inadequate 
resources and personnel.  Little, if any, practical experience is possessed in 
England of any of these problems and it will be necessary to cover in six months 
what the Germans have covered in six years.”31   
                                                 
28
 Norton, The Red Devils, p.2 
29
 HMSO, By Air To Battle,  p.7 
30
 Ibid p.9 
31
 Otway, Airborne Forces, p.23 
 21 
Instructors initially had little more experience than their trainees.  Gradually the 
knowledge of how to conduct limited and then larger parachute operations was 
worked out.  Accidents and occasional fatalities accompanied such progress32 
but it is remarkable how few people were killed or seriously injured, rather than 
how many, even in the very earliest days at Ringway airport, where the Central 
Landing School (later the Central Landing Establishment) was located. 
 
The original parachute unit of five hundred men expanded rapidly.  On a purely 
numerical issue, the most significant thing in evaluating the airborne forces 
possessed by Britain in late 1944 is how numerous they were when compared 
with the situation just four short years previously.  By September 1944, Britain 
possessed two Airborne Divisions (the 1st and 6th) as well as an independent 
parachute brigade (the 2nd) and a variety of other airborne units.  All could be 
considered among the cream of Britain‟s land forces.   
 
Second, some of the most important issues were resolved early on, such as the 
design of the parachute, the height at which troops should be dropped and the 
carriage of personal equipment.33  These were critical developments as the main 
workhorse of the glider force and the carrier of most of an airborne division‟s 
heavier equipment and more heavily armed troops, the Horsa, did not make an 
appearance until June 1942.   Initial trials with the jumper standing on the back of 
a converted Whitley aircraft and pulling his own ripcord, thereby being dragged 
                                                 
32
 The first parachute course began jumping at Ringway on 21 July 1940. The first fatality occurred on 25 
July 1940. 
33
 Even though produced under extremely inadequate circumstances, some of the kit and equipment that 
was designed and produced at this stage, such as the X type parachute, kit bag and Horsa glider, were 
among the very best of any combatant nation during the war. 
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off, were not successful.  Most importantly, the time delay between one jumper 
and the next meant a widely dispersed parachute force on the ground.  The 
preferred method that was developed, and one that remained in use until the 
Dakota became the main transportation aircraft, was to jump through a hole in 
the floor of a converted bomber.  This enabled a much more rapid dispatch of an 
aircraft‟s load than the „pull off method.‟ 
 
Another important development, that of the „X‟ type parachute in 1940, enabled 
British airborne forces to be issued with what was arguably the best parachute of 
the whole war.  It was superior to both American and German designs and, with 
only slight modifications, continued to be used well into the 1990‟s.34  Its reliability 
was such that out of the hundreds of thousands of descents carried out using it, 
the chance of a fatal parachute malfunction was approximately one in twelve 
thousand35.  
 
Another system which was developed early on, one which proved vital for 
parachuting with increased amounts of equipment, was that of the kit bag.  This 
was strapped to the leg of the parachutist and lowered by a quick release device 
once the canopy had deployed.  Whilst moving with it strapped to the leg was 
extremely difficult, especially within the cramped confines of the redundant 
bombers initially used for parachuting, “it rapidly became an indispensable part of 
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the parachutist‟s equipment”36 and proved a straightforward issue when jumping 
from the Dakota.  Even if they were still relatively lightly-armed, it enabled 
parachute formations to land with more ammunition and equipment than could 
otherwise be carried.  With their personal weapons to hand, kitbags went a long 
way to dealing with the major problems encountered when using containers, that 
of them disappearing or being irretrievable.  This was an advantage that many 
German paratroopers had not had during the landings on Crete, often with fatal 
consequences.  
 
The issue of gliders and the selection and training of glider pilots was also 
resolved as the war progressed.  It was evident, even from the earliest days of 
1940, that gliders would be needed to land the heavier equipment that 
paratroops lacked but required.  They also seemed to offer a more promising line 
of development in several other respects.  More troops could be landed, with 
heavier equipment instantly available and in a unified body than was possible by 
paratroops, who would inevitably take time to reorganise once landed.37   This 
was a major advantage in their ability to capitalise on the element of surprise.  
Also, until the Curtis-Wright C-46 Commando was first used in Europe in March 
1945, a Horsa glider could hold more troops than any parachute aircraft used by 
the British.  There were obvious limitations to the use of gliders, such as the need 
for extremely large and flat landing zones for the gliders to land on and the 
extreme precariousness of trying to use them at night, factors not so prevalent in 
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the use of paratroops.  However, since the quantity of aircraft available between 
1940 and 1943 was an overriding factor, it appeared to make the most sense to 
concentrate on glider forces making up a significant part of any airborne force. 
 
Against this, gliders were extremely vulnerable when approaching a target (as 
witnessed during Operations Husky and Varsity particularly) and relied intimately 
on the navigation and expertise of their tug crews in order to reach the target.  
Nevertheless, the airlanding brigades that developed were amongst the most 
heavily-armed of any British infantry brigades during the war and were 
substantially larger than any of the parachute brigades.  In the original proposals 
for an airborne force in 1940, it was envisaged as being three-quarters glider-
borne.  Whilst these figures changed as the airborne divisions gradually assumed 
their final establishment and organisation, by 1944 the airlanding brigades were 
still generally between eight to nine hundred men stronger than any of the 
corresponding parachute brigades. 
 
Several types of glider were developed, foremost among them the Horsa and 
Hamilcar.  The Horsa became available from mid 1942 but the Hamilcar endured 
significant delays in its production.  Even so, without either of these two gliders, 
the ability to transfer important heavy equipment, particularly artillery, and the 6-
pounder and 17-pounder anti-tank guns, would have proved impossible.  The 
pooling of resources between British and American forces also meant that the 
American Hadrian (or Waco) gliders were also used on occasion, though proved 
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to be less popular than the Horsa due to their smaller size and inability to 
transport heavier and larger items of equipment. 
 
The Air Ministry was originally adamant that only fully-trained RAF or Army 
seconded pilots should fly gliders.  However, shortage of aircrew meant that from 
late August 1941, it was accepted that glider pilots would be volunteers from the 
Army, although the term „glider coxswains‟ was used somewhat disparagingly for 
a time.  The concept of the glider pilot as the „total soldier‟ became 
institutionalised early on.  Not only could they fly a glider into battle but they were 
able to fight as well.  Every action of World War Two in which they took part bore 
witness to this latter fact.  This is something which stands in marked contrast to 
some US glider pilots, about whom the American airborne General, James 
Gavin, used to complain that once landed “were little more than a nuisance, 
willing … but with no idea what to do.”38  
 
It was the period May to December 1943 that saw the most important 
developments within the airborne establishment.  In many ways these were also 
the least exciting, since they involved administration and organisation.  However, 
British airborne troops were subsequently to benefit immensely from such 
changes.  In particular, it was Major-General Browning39 who highlighted the 
necessary changes and formalised the processes by which airborne forces 
should be organised and used.    In his report of 20 August, 1943, he made 
recommendations which subsequently became accepted practice.  In essence, a 
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chain of command extending from the War Office, through 21 Army Group 
Headquarters to Headquarters, Airborne Troops (HQAT) and from there down to 
divisional commanders was established.   
 
 Three areas in particular are worth highlighting.  Firstly a division was now to be 
considered “the minimum force used for operation[s].”40  Second, HQAT now 
controlled, advised, trained, co-ordinated and informed world-wide all who served 
with or came into contact with all Allied airborne forces (less American airborne).   
It was the single most important step to establishing the direction and 
organisation for all subsequent British airborne operations for 1944 and 1945.  
Third, the formation of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA) in August 1944 was 
an extension of this principle and gave greater focus and control to the use of all 
Allied airborne units, something which had definitely been lacking up to this point.  
 
The combination of the changes described above and especially the lessons 
learned from the airborne experience on D-Day41, the first time a complete British 
airborne division had been used in battle, now placed the British airborne arm in 
a position where the fullest possible use could be made of their capabilities.  The 
landings at Arnhem and at Hamminkeln were both the product of at least 4 years 
worth of airborne experience.  The following chapters examine just how 
successfully these concepts were applied in the events at Arnhem and the Rhine 
crossing.    
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Chapter II. Operation ‘Market Garden’ 17-25 September 1944. 
 
Plans, Concepts and Reasons for Failure. 
 
Operation Market Garden was the largest airborne operation of the whole war 
and is also probably the most famous.  The nine day struggle of the 1st Airborne 
Division around Arnhem and Oosterbeek won them undying fame and has 
entered the annals of history as probably the airborne battle of the whole war.  It 
was, however, a defeat and the casualty lists make for sobering reading.  Nearly 
twelve thousand42 men landed at Arnhem.  Almost 1,500 were to die there or 
perish in the following weeks from wounds sustained whilst fighting.  The 1st 
Airborne Division effectively ceased to exist, with less than two thousand of its 
men being evacuated at the battle‟s end.  Elsewhere thousands more, including 
American airborne soldiers, soldiers from Horrocks‟ XXX Corps, and RAF and 
RASC personnel, were to be killed, wounded or made prisoner.  
 
Consequently, the fighting that took place around Arnhem and Oosterbeek 
cannot be seen in complete isolation from the rest of the events of Market 
Garden.  However, in order to focus on those concepts, expectations and 
realities which affected the British at Arnhem, the planning and actions 
undertaken by the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions around Eindhoven 
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and Nijmegen will be ignored, unless they directly impacted on the British 
component.  
 
From the preceding gloomy appraisal of Market Garden, one could reasonably 
ask whether any of the central concepts behind the use of the British and Polish 
Airborne units had been applied at Arnhem.  If they were, how it was possible for 
such a disaster to have befallen what was commonly regarded as one of the 
premier units in the British Army?  It was certainly through no fault of the fighting 
soldier.  When the fighting at Arnhem Bridge finally ended on 21 September, 
some German soldiers, only recently captured, were freed.  A high ranking SS 
Officer commented to one such soldier that “having fought on all fronts before, he 
had never encountered such a hard … foe.”43  Even General Bittrich, commander 
of II SS Panzer Corps, admitted later that he “had never seen men fight as hard 
as the British at Arnhem and Oosterbeek.”44 
 
With hindsight, the original plan for Market Garden seems incredibly bold and 
imaginative, perhaps overly so.  Much criticism has been laid at General 
Montgomery‟s feet for the daring nature of the plan.  Then commander of 21st 
Army Group, he was convinced that the risks were worth taking and that the end 
of the war in Europe might be realised in 1944 if the operation was successful.  
All activity in war is a calculated gamble, since one can never really be sure what 
the enemy is doing.  What was conclusively known was that German losses in 
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Normandy, particularly the staggering level of destruction45 inflicted upon them at 
Falaise, had been enormous. The „Falaise Gap‟ was only finally closed on 21 
August 1944, less than four weeks before Operation Market Garden was 
launched.  German forces were left reeling as the Allies rapidly advanced across 
France and into Belgium.  British troops advanced over 200 miles in just one 
week, capturing Antwerp and Brussels, before encountering increased resistance 
on the Meuse-Escaut Canal in Belgium at the start of September.  This gave an 
undeniable impression of the German army in North-West Europe being in a 
state of imminent collapse.   
 
At the same time, supply lines for a continuous Allied advance had reached crisis 
levels.  The port of Antwerp could not be used as the island of Walcheren and its 
coastal defences still lay in German hands.  Cherbourg was now too distant from 
the front line to be of much further use.  All other ports recently captured could 
not handle the vast tonnage required for a general Allied advance.  The worry 
was that experience clearly showed the Wehrmacht was capable of recovering 
quickly, if given breathing space.  Therefore the advance had to continue quickly.   
 
Both Patton and Hodges, commanding the US Third and First Armies further 
south, and Montgomery, commanding 21st Army Group on the left flank, were 
adamant that resources should be provided to them for the continuing drive, in 
the latter‟s case into Belgium and Holland.  One of the overriding factors for 
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continuing with the northern flank was that the range of transport aircraft based in 
Britain, where the FAAA was located, meant that any use of airborne troops 
favoured Montgomery.  Additionally, the North German countryside was much 
better suited to armoured warfare than further south. 
 
Eisenhower did not agree with the concept of a “pencil-like thrust”46 and did not 
divert all resources to Montgomery.  Nevertheless he allowed Montgomery to 
proceed with his plan and more logistical resources, an extra thousand tons a 
day, were allocated to him as a result of the meeting between the two senior 
generals on 10 September.  The concept devised by Montgomery was simple 
enough in outline.  An airborne force would capture all the main bridges leading 
from the Allied front line in northern Belgium through to the Rhine at Arnhem, 
with the British airborne troops at the northern end of the corridor.  Powerful 
armoured ground forces would then smash through and could either go straight 
for the coast, splitting Holland in two and trapping large numbers of German 
troops, or turn right and head into what remained of Germany‟s industrial 
heartland.  Originally the airborne component of this plan, codenamed COMET, 
envisaged all these tasks being completed by 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 
Parachute Brigade.  The only other plan considered at this time, codenamed 
INFATUATE, was to use the FAAA to assist in clearing the Scheldt Estuary.   
 
The two main problems with this latter task, namely the strength of the flak 
defences and the lack of suitable landing sites, meant this plan was vetoed early 
                                                 
46
 Major-General R Urquhart, Arnhem, (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2007), p.3 
 31 
on.  One other issue is also important to note.  So many airborne plans had been 
prepared and cancelled at short notice that Lieutenant-General Browning, then 
deputy commander of FAAA, informed its Headquarters in August 1944 that 1st 
Airborne Division, the Polish Parachute Brigade and 52nd Lowland Division47, 
were at seven days readiness for operations.  What this meant in effect was that 
the detailed planning which had accompanied the use of 6th Airborne in 
Normandy, something regarded as a core concept for the use of airborne troops, 
was being relaxed.   
 
Such was the speed of the Allied advance and the perceived expectation of 
German collapse, lengthy planning would only prevent British airborne troops 
from being used.  Even many who held strong reservations about Market Garden 
were of the opinion that “shortcomings in the plan were readily forgiven as long 
as we could get in there.”48  Consequently, seven days was all the preparation 
time that was afforded to those who took part in Market Garden.  One quote 
above all others stands as representative of the opinions of using the airborne 
troops in less than ideal circumstances.  General Lewis Brereton, commander of 
the FAAA, said “the disorganisation of the enemy demands that chances be 
taken.”49 
 
However, that in turn meant that intelligence about the enemy‟s strengths and 
dispositions could be less than ideal.  Only two main voices were raised prior to 
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Arnhem about this issue and both incurred the displeasure of Browning.  One 
intelligence officer, Major Brian Urquhart, raised on 15th September the issue of 
recent aerial photographs of Arnhem, Dutch resistance reports and even reports 
from Montgomery‟s 21st Army Group, all of which pointed to greatly increased 
German strength there.  None of these were full or precise and could well have 
been wrong.  Crucially, no-one involved in the planning was privy to ULTRA 
intercepts, which would have categorically proved the extent of German forces 
present around Arnhem, had they been disseminated.  Browning considered the 
information presented to him but the operation was not cancelled or amended 
and he ensured Major Urquhart was „sent on sick leave.‟   
 
General Sosabowski was the other dissenting voice.  He was intensely unhappy 
with many aspects of Operation COMET and “felt so certain that [Market Garden] 
was doomed to failure that he requested Browning to let him have his orders in 
writing.”50   Almost every historical analysis of Market Garden makes use of these 
two voices as clear indications of a doomed plan grinding inescapably to its 
foregone conclusion.  Both Urquhart and Sosabowski were proved correct in their 
reservations, even though the plan came close to being successful, and no doubt 
reflected ruefully on events until their dying day.  However, like most disasters 
that occur, other factors were equally important. 
 
Of the other causes of the failure, all have been investigated at length and it 
would prove impossible to undertake a full analysis within the confines of this 
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work.  However, several issues are so vital and run so strongly counter to the 
concepts and policies established that any examination of the effectiveness of 
the airborne troops at Arnhem cannot take place without them being mentioned.   
 
First, the lack of aircraft allocated to the British for the initial landings at Arnhem 
was nothing short of devastating in its effects.  Every airborne commander would 
have agreed with Urquhart when he stated that “an airborne division is designed 
to fight as a whole and should be dropped or landed as such.”51  The piecemeal 
landings were identified by the Germans as “the enemy‟s chief mistake.”52   
 
A proposed plan by 38 Group to get round the issue of lack of aircraft was to 
transport two lifts on the first day.  They had suggested that the first lift would 
arrive on the DZs and LZs before dawn on 17 September, returning to drop a 
second lift later that day.  Brigadier-General Paul Williams, commander of IX US 
Troop Carrier Command (IX TCC) and the man in overall charge of the airlift, 
informed Brereton that “concerns about aircrew fatigue and the time needed to 
undertake aircraft maintenance and repair battle damage”53 meant only one lift 
would be considered on the first day.  Furthermore, there would be no moon at 
that date and “both doctrine and experience warned against attempting airborne 
missions in total darkness.”54  Whilst one can understand the importance of the 
latter point, such a risk-averse policy, standing in stark contrast to the whole 
concept of Market Garden‟s „airborne carpet‟, was to have tragic consequences. 
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Instead, only two brigades, one parachute and one airlanding, were landed on 
the first day in the LZs and DZs west of Arnhem. The glider-borne troops were 
required to guard these areas for subsequent lifts whilst 1 Parachute Brigade 
pushed towards the bridge in Arnhem. One former glider pilot55 at Arnhem, 
interviewed in 2010, was still surprised that greater use was not made of the far 
more numerous and heavily-armed glider troops of 1st Airlanding Brigade in the 
initial push, they being sent forward to take the bridge instead of the fewer 
numbers of paratroopers.  Even General Urquhart himself stated in his memoirs 
“that the troops used in the protection of the DZs and LZs would have been 
invaluable offensively during the first twenty-four hours.  Perhaps our ideas were 
wrong.”56     
 
This point can be endlessly debated and boils down, in essence, to one of 
quantity versus quality. The two parachute brigades were the main component of 
1st Airborne Division and the parachute battalions were trained to a generally 
high standard.  They also had an extremely high level of fitness and an 
aggressive attitude towards soldiering.  The glider troops, by comparison, were 
not volunteers and were made up of battalions transferred en masse to form the 
airlanding force.  In his book, Middlebrook makes the point that “they may have 
lacked a little of the aggression in attack of the parachute battalions, but they 
were steadfast in defence; their character was probably halfway between the 
doggedness of ordinary British troops and the dash of parachute troops.”57  The 
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one indisputable point that can be made is that by failing to land more troops in 
the first lift (in line with the agreed policy of concentration) or make greater use of 
1st Airlanding Brigade, the troops of 1st, 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions were to 
find their lack of numbers, heavier weapons and ammunition telling when they 
began to run into German troops, a situation that was only to worsen as time 
went on. 
 
General Urquhart had the circumstances of the lift forced on him.  Browning 
explained, quite correctly, that “it‟s got to be bottom to top or you stand a chance 
of being massacred.”58  In other words, if the American links in the chain failed, 
the British and Poles at Arnhem would be left stranded and destroyed.  This 
meant nearly all of the 101st Airborne, landing north of Eindhoven, was carried in 
the first lift (albeit without much of its own artillery since it was closest to the 
heavy artillery of XXX Corps) and the 82nd Airborne arrived in two lifts.  What was 
difficult to understand at the time, and still seems nothing short of egotistical 
today, was that Browning took 38 gliders from Urquhart‟s first lift in order that his 
Corps Headquarters could be taken in with 82nd Airborne Division.  That would 
have more than covered the gliders needed to lift either the remaining 75mm 
artillery guns of 1st Airlanding Light Regiment (33 gliders needed), the anti-tank 
guns of 2nd Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery (27 gliders required) or almost an entire 
extra Airlanding Battalion (41 gliders required), all of which would have been of 
far greater value than Browning‟s Headquarters at that stage of the battle.  A 
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delay of some sort on Browning‟s part would undoubtedly have been more 
prudent. 
   
As one writer mentioned, “the general who commanded airborne troops … was 
no more useful than a private soldier until such time as he established his 
headquarters and assumed command by communication.”59 Browning did much 
excellent work on behalf of British airborne troops throughout the war, most of 
which was behind the scenes but nonetheless vital.  This action, though, did 
quite the opposite and flew in the face of concepts which he had been 
instrumental in developing.  He had been adamant in North Africa that “airborne 
troops in a major campaign could only influence a battle if they were used in 
large formations.”60  One German Prisoner of War (POW) made reference to this 
when interviewed after his capture.  He highlighted the fact that the lack of 
concentration had proved critical, since “the Germans never faced the entire 
strength of the British 1 Para Div at one time.”61  
 
Browning‟s use of so many gliders was a largely futile attempt to gain airborne 
combat experience, the lack of which he felt enormously, at the expense of mass 
being delivered at a totally critical point and time.  Moreover, his headquarters 
were of no use to 1st Airborne Division or the US 101st Airborne Division, at that 
time or subsequently.  As soon as XXX Corps relieved the 101st, the Americans 
came under Horrock‟s control.  Furthermore, until such time as XXX Corps 
                                                 
59
 Dover, Sky Generals, p. 56 
60
 Ibid, p.59 
61
 Unknown author, German Intelligence Notes On Arnhem Operation, Summary No. 207, Part 1 
 37 
reached the beleaguered British and Poles at Arnhem and Oosterbeek, almost 
nothing that Browning could say or do affected their situation.  As Middlebrook 
comments, “for most of the week Browning had little influence on what was 
happening to the three airborne divisions he was supposed to be commanding.”62  
In reality he was “little more than an observer.”63 
 
If this seems a harsh assessment of Browning, there is no doubt that the events 
at Arnhem caused him great personal distress in the years that followed the 
battle.  He too had had serious reservations about Market Garden, believing it 
rushed and that concepts necessary for the successful use of airborne troops 
were being dangerously stretched, especially concerning the distance that XXX 
Corps had to travel to link up with 1st Airborne and the lack of aircraft for lifting.  
This makes it even more difficult to understand his decision to take so many 
gliders from Urquhart‟s first lift.  It was his belief that parts of what transpired 
were his fault.  Indeed it would be impossible not to lay some of the blame 
squarely at his feet.  As a case in point, the meeting between Sosabowski, 
Horrocks, Browning and Major-General Ivor Thomas, commanding 43rd Wessex 
Division, at Valburg on Sunday 24th September was instrumental in how the 
battle ended.  As events turned out, the Polish General was withering in his 
assessment of Browning‟s decisions at this stage, writing “it is incredible that 
Browning … did not use all his powers to encourage and persuade Horrocks, 
Dempsey and Montgomery to have a final go… I have often wondered whether 
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[Montgomery] would have endorsed Horrocks‟s plan to carry out a major assault 
and then, perhaps, the Battle of Arnhem would have been turned into a victory 
instead of a defeat.”64  
 
The extremely frank exchange of opinions between the two generals that 
occurred later that day, when he “forcibly told Browning what he thought of British 
commanders who carried out a major operation across a series of wide rivers 
without bringing forward a good supply of boats”65 was the final nail in the coffin 
as far as relations between the two were concerned.  However correct 
Sosabowski‟s opinions, Browning did not want to hear them and shortly 
thereafter was instrumental in his dismissal from the command of the Polish 
Parachute Brigade. 
 
Another area responsible for much that ensued at Arnhem was the distance that 
the troops were landed from their target.  Two factors influenced planning here.  
The confusion caused by the highly dispersed night landing in Normandy meant 
that only a day landing was considered for Market Garden.  Furthermore, it had 
been established as a central concept for some time within airborne forces that 
troops, whether landing by parachute or glider, must land within a close distance 
of the target, normally five miles at the most.  Yet any LZs/DZs close to the 
bridge were small in size and flak defences in the area were cited by the RAF as 
„heavy‟.  Regarding this latter point, one RAF officer ruefully admitted “in point of 
fact, there was little accurate information as to the location of active flak… The 
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overriding factor was the ability of the glider pilots to get down in enclosed 
country … The experience of US glider pilots on D Day was still fresh in people‟s 
minds.  The presence or otherwise of flak was incidental.”66 
 
Whatever the exact reason, the LZs and DZs chosen were located some 
distance west of Arnhem, further than a central concept of airborne planning 
would normally tolerate.  This is often highlighted as a most serious mistake, and 
indeed it was, given the relatively slow speed of movement which the British 
were capable of.  However, what compounded this into such a significant error 
was that most German troops in the local area reacted quickly, positively and 
aggressively.  Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say the speed of the 
German reaction was incredible. 
 
Although surprised by the arrival of the British and unsure initially as to the exact 
location and target of the landings, they either advanced towards the general 
area of the landings or set up blocking positions at vital spots on the approaches 
into Arnhem.  One German officer, SS-Captain Sepp Krafft, explained the 
importance of attacking “the [airborne] enemy immediately with any forces 
available, not with any hope of destroying him but to disturb and disrupt his 
preparations for battle.”  With the small force available to him, Krafft knew he 
could only act as a delaying force in order “to secure time to prepare counter-
measures.”67  These blocking positions and scattered attacks inflicted such 
delays on most of 1st Parachute Brigade as they moved towards the Arnhem 
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bridge that the British plan started going seriously awry within the first day.  Only 
one unit, Frost‟s 2nd Parachute Battalion, managed to bypass the German 
blocking position and reach the bridge.  They were ultimately to be destroyed 
there, subjected to incessant attacks on all sides by armour, infantry, artillery and 
mortars, deprived of any reinforcements or resupply due to their encirclement 
and literally blasted into submission.   
 
The extraordinarily rapid and violent response from German forces, all caused 
the ambitious plan for the British troops at Arnhem to start falling apart very 
quickly.  The arrival of 4th Parachute Brigade in the second lift on the afternoon of 
18 September had little effect in changing this situation and merely reinforced an 
extremely dire predicament.  The die was cast for 1st Airborne Division.  
 
The lack of speedy relief by XXX Corps assumed a great importance, from which 
several other issues became increasingly significant, as the battle at Arnhem 
continued.  It had always been agreed that lightly-armed airborne troops needed 
ground forces to relieve them within a short period of time if they were not to be 
destroyed or defeated.  Just as many argued that the Arnhem LZs and DZs were 
too far from the target, one of the central arguments against using airborne 
troops as far forward as Arnhem was that it was too distant from the ground 
forces that would supposedly relieve them within two days.  1st Airborne Division 
was nearly 60 miles in front of the positions of XXX Corps when they landed 
north of Heelsum.  Browning‟s immortal phrase of „a bridge too far‟ began to 
assume greater reality as the drive by XXX Corps became delayed, sometimes 
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due to German activity and sometimes due to a lack of urgency on the part of the 
British.  Whatever the reasons, the length of time which the British airborne 
troops were expected to hold out for until relieved expanded.  Where this became 
a critical issue was in five areas; ammunition, food, rest, reinforcements and 
resupply.  
 
British troops became worn down through lack of sleep and food.  Attacks 
continued incessantly.  More importantly, their ammunition became critically short 
as aerial resupply proved tragically ineffective, in spite of the Herculean efforts of 
resupply aircraft.  Finally, the British were never able to land enough 
reinforcements in any of the two following lifts, as opposed to the ever-increasing 
numbers of German troops, to regain the initiative.  This proved decisive in 
tipping the favour increasingly in favour of the German forces ranged against 
them, especially as casualties mounted within the airborne perimeter and at the 
bridge. 
 
One point in particular is worth elaborating on.  If there is one thing virtually every 
airborne veteran from Arnhem is agreed upon, it is the unparalleled valour of the 
crews of the resupply aircraft.  Urquhart was moved to write of one Dakota, that 
belonging to Flight Lieutenant David Lord, which crashed on 19 September, after 
making two resupply runs.  “We were spellbound and speechless … I daresay 
there is not a survivor of Arnhem who will ever forget, or want to forget, the 
courage we were privileged to witness.”68  Lord was subsequently awarded the 
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Victoria Cross.  Tragically, of the 390 tons of various supplies dropped that day, 
only 31 tons (less than 8%) was recovered by the British.  The rest fell into 
enemy hands.  Throughout the battle, high losses in resupply aircraft (over 21% 
on one day) and the inability to communicate with the RAF meant less than 8% 
of all supplies dropped at such cost were retrieved by the airborne soldiers.  This 
was one of the most important factors in crippling the ability of 1st Airborne 
Division to fight as effectively as it could, something the Germans were only too 
aware of. 
  
The eventual withdrawal from Oosterbeek on 25 September drew the nine day 
battle to a close.  Arnhem itself was not finally liberated until April 1945, a shell of 
the city it had been before the war.  The central causes of the defeat have been 
examined in detail for many years but, as previously mentioned, the failure to 
abide by four core concepts of intelligence, concentration, closeness to target 
and rapid relief, all had tragic consequences.  Many other reasons also affected 
the outcome of the battle.  Warren highlighted that Market Garden was “unique 
as the only large … airborne operation during World War Two for which there 
was no training program, no rehearsal, almost no exercises, and a generally low 
level of tactical training activity,”69 something which stands in marked contrast to 
preceding airborne operations on D-Day and Operation Varsity after it. 
 
One could also highlight Browning‟s removal of 38 gliders from Urquhart‟s first 
lift, failures with communication, not enough boats being available to launch a 
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large-scale assault once XXX Corps reached the Lower Rhine, the lack of 
resupply, the German ability to improvise ad-hoc battle groups and their rapid 
reinforcing of troops and especially armour at Arnhem, the delays affecting XXX 
Corps in the south, particularly around Nijmegen and so on.  What is certain is 
that, even though some factors fall outside the concepts of how airborne forces 
should be used, the sum of all these elements “spelt the doom of 1st British 
Airborne Division.”70 
 
Even though the situation in September 1944 was very different to that of June 
1944, Allied commanders discovered to their cost that airborne forces were not a 
panacea to reinvigorate a stalled advance and that the German forces which had 
appeared on the verge of total collapse were far from finished.  Whilst no longer 
capable of final victory, many German commanders were still capable, if suitably 
supplied, of inflicting punishing reversals on Allied mistakes.  In spite of this, the 
bold and imaginative plan behind Market Garden, had it succeeded, would 
almost certainly have dramatically shortened the war.  In the opinion of General 
Günther Blumentritt, then Chief of Staff to the German Commander-in-Chief on 
the western front, “there were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the 
end of August our front was wide open.” Such a breakthrough, had it succeeded, 
would have undoubtedly altered the post-war map of Europe.  One German was 
even of the opinion “that Germany‟s biggest disaster of the war was to win the 
Battle Arnhem.”71  It was a gamble that so nearly paid off.   
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Urquhart‟s report, finished in January 1945, eloquently summed up the feelings 
of most of those who served at Arnhem.  “The losses were heavy but all ranks 
appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable.  There is no doubt that all 
would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.  
We have no regrets.”72   The tragedy was, as the historian Dr. John Warren 
noted, “All objectives save Arnhem had been won, but without Arnhem the rest 
were as nothing.  In return for so much courage and sacrifice, the Allies had won 
a 50-mile salient – leading nowhere.”73  A second chance for an airborne 
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Chapter III. Operation ‘Varsity’ 24 March 1945. 
 
Plans, Concepts and Controversies. 
 
The next major Allied airborne attack took place almost six months to the day 
after the fighting at Arnhem had drawn to a close and was again focused on 
attempting to cross the Rhine.  The airborne component for the Allied crossing of 
the Rhine in March 1945, Operation Varsity, saw the last major use of airborne 
forces in the European theatre and indeed in World War Two.  This operation 
was significant in several ways and marked the continued evolution of not only 
British but also Allied airborne forces.   Of greatest significance, in the space of 
just a few hours two complete airborne divisions were landed north of Wesel in 
support of the crossing of the Rhine by the British 2nd Army.  It was, and still is, 
the largest single landing of airborne troops in one location and on one day ever.  
Larger numbers of airborne troops had been dropped in Normandy and in 
Holland in 1944 but these had been spread over several days and had involved 
several lifts, something which allowed the multiple use of carrier and tug aircraft.  
Transporting all the airborne troops in one go stretched the abilities of the RAF 
and USAAF to the very maximum and meant a third airborne division, the US 
13th, could not be used. 
 
By way of background to Operation Varsity, the various reports from the 
survivors of 1st Airborne, 38 and 46 Groups RAF and XXX Corps all highlighted 
previously mentioned conceptual, tactical and strategic errors in the planning and 
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implementation of Market Garden.  Even more illuminating were documents 
captured from the Germans in December 1944.  These exposed the German 
view of Market Garden and the reasons for their success.  All were closely 
analysed and changes were implemented where considered appropriate.  The 
lessons of Sicily, Normandy, southern France and Holland may have starkly 
showed the limitations of such troops but it was impossible for any keen analyst 
not to be also aware of how significant their use had been on occasion.  It is 
entirely understandable why Montgomery wanted to use them in his second 
attempt to cross the Rhine.   
 
Between Market Garden and March 1945, Allied airborne troops, with the 
exception of SAS units, were only used in a ground role.  Most famously, the 
troops from the British 6th, US 82nd and especially the US 101st Airborne Divisions 
were rushed to the Ardennes and employed in blunting the final German 
offensive of the war, most commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge.  After the 
battle finally ended in January 1945, all airborne units were withdrawn and sent 
to prepare for any future airborne tasking.  That moment came for the 6th and US 
17th Airborne Division in March 1945.  At this stage, Montgomery‟s 21st Army 
Group was closed up on the western bank of the Rhine and he planned an 
extensive set-piece attack from land and air to cross it.  These attacks were 
code-named Operations „Plunder‟ and „Varsity‟ respectively.  Planning for the 
airborne component extended as far back as 7 November 1944, when FAAA 
published its first „Staff Study‟ of Operation Varsity.  
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Further south, and much to Patton‟s intense delight, the troops of Hodges‟ First 
US Army and his Third US Army had already crossed the Rhine at Remagen (7 
March 1945) and Nierstein/Oppenheim (22 March 1945) respectively.  
Nevertheless, it was northern Germany that offered greater promise.  As one 
German General said, “He who holds northern Germany holds Germany.”74  
Regardless of the achievements of the Americans, the British crossing of the 
Rhine would help expedite a rapid push into the industrial heartland of Germany 
through terrain much better suited to large armoured forces than further south.   
 
Extremely mindful after the „Battle of the Bulge‟ of the risks to flanks and with the 
recent airborne experience of Arnhem still dominating the minds of Allied 
commanders, the concepts behind using airborne forces had altered.  There 
were two fundamental changes involved in Operation Varsity when compared to 
any previous airborne landing.  First, the two airborne divisions were to be landed 
complete, side by side and only a few miles away from the Rhine and the 
attacking Allied troops involved in Plunder.  Second, the troops would be landed 
right on top of the enemy, thereby negating both a prolonged march to an 
objective and also the Germans‟ ability to organise a coherent defence before the 
link-up with ground forces or other neighbouring airborne units could be 
achieved.   
 
The planning for the use of 6th and 17th Airborne Divisions on Varsity was 
ultimately directed towards disrupting any German resistance in the area of the 
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river crossings and preventing any reinforcements from attacking the ground 
forces‟ bridgehead.  For 6th Airborne in particular, their mission was the seizure, 
clearance and retention of the high ground north-west of Wesel, the village of 
Hamminkeln and the capture of three road and railway bridges across the Issel 
River.  In outline, the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades were to be landed to the 
west and north-west of Hamminkeln between 10am and 1020am, followed by 6th 
Airlanding Brigade some minutes later.  At the same time, 17th Airborne Division 
would land a short distance to the south.  With a maximum distance of 
approximately five miles separating the most northern British paratrooper from 
the most southern US paratrooper, it was an extremely concentrated mass of 
nearly 17,000 airborne troops.   
 
Further lessons were also implemented.  To prevent any possibility of the 
airborne forces being isolated and destroyed, they would not be landed until such 
time as the ground attack (Operation Plunder) had successfully established 
themselves across the Rhine.  Furthermore, almost all the airborne troops would 
be in range of the copious numbers of artillery pieces of all calibres dug in on the 
west bank of the Rhine from the moment they landed.  Almost two hundred guns 
were to be used for direct support by Artillery Forward Observers landing with 6th 
and 17th Airborne, with just over half going to the British and the rest to the 
Americans.  It was a colossal amount of artillery firepower available „on call‟.  
When combined with another recent development , the newly created „Forward 
Visual Control Parties‟ (FVCP), whose job it was to direct close support fighter 
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aircraft on to targets, it meant that the lightly-armed 6th Airborne had a 
unprecedented increase in firepower available to them.  
 
Whilst the river crossing and airborne attack fell directly under the command of 
General Miles Dempsey‟s 2nd Army, „Plunder Varsity‟ was very much a 
Montgomery showpiece, something which showed in the huge accumulation of 
stores, ammunition, equipment and men in the two weeks prior to the attack.  In 
marked comparison to Patton‟s crossing of the Rhine on 22 March 1945, where 
he “sneaked a division across”75 across, Montgomery‟s affair was representative 
of the greater number of German forces facing him and was planned, deliberate 
and comprehensive.  It also ultimately involved a delay of some weeks.   
 
The German forces facing the oncoming Allied assault along that part of the 
Rhine were not oblivious to the probability of airborne forces being used.  
General Schlemm, commanding the German 1st Parachute Army, had “only a 
vague idea of what was facing [him]”76 but most German commanders agreed 
“the temptation for Allied commanders to use airborne troops would be too 
great.”77  They identified that parachute and glider operations in the area 
between Wesel and Emmerich were the most likely and planned, with the 
meagre resources available to them, how they would try and deal with such 
attacks.  The options available to them were extremely limited, such was the 
Allied superiority in artillery and the ever-present threat of ground attack aircraft.  
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Nevertheless, 114 heavy and 712 light anti-aircraft guns78 were installed in the 
area where Varsity was to take place and it was the most worrying and feared 
aspect for airborne planners.   
 
The cautious nature of Operation Plunder Varsity came in for a great deal of 
criticism from some American commanders, particularly Patton, and from various 
historians since.  There were no such criticisms from the most senior German 
commander facing Montgomery.  Field Marshal Kesselring, the newly-appointed 
overall German commander of her defences in the west, was complimentary 
about Montgomery‟s plan and preparations, saying, “The technical preparations 
were exemplary … and the massing of forces was commensurate with the 
undertaking and the Allies‟ resources.”79  It was a highly co-ordinated and 
complex attack, fully cognisant of the fact that there would be no toleration of 
another Arnhem, and aimed to defeat the enemy through the use of well-briefed 
and equipped troops being launched into battle in overwhelming numbers.  On 
paper at least, Operations Plunder and Varsity formed an impressive combined 
effort to „unhinge‟ the German Rhine defences between Wesel and Rees and so 
enable rapid Allied penetration of northern Germany. 
 
In recent years, Varsity has also attracted increasing attention due to the very 
high losses sustained during its execution.  In contrast with the relatively light 
losses of the ground component that crossed the Rhine by boat, the losses to the 
airborne component were extremely severe.  In the space of less than 24 hours, 
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6th Airborne lost nearly fourteen hundred men killed, wounded or missing80 out of 
the seven thousand plus men who were airlifted into battle that morning.  It was a 
casualty rate that was substantially higher than at Arnhem.  This has led some 
historians to question whether the operation was a suitable task for such a highly 
trained and valuable division.  Max Hastings called it a “folly for which more than 
a thousand men paid with their lives – almost as many as 1st Airborne lost killed 
[in nine days] at Arnhem.”81 
 
This point of view notwithstanding, Operation Varsity should have been the 
culmination of all British airborne experience up to that point in the war.  
However, in spite the lessons from all previous airborne operations being 
uppermost in the minds of planners and commanders, the landings near 
Hamminkeln proved anything but simple and straightforward.  The high casualty 
figures and the significant losses and damage to gliders, transport and resupply 
aircraft that ensued were certainly not the highpoint that Allied commanders 
hoped for and indicated that many lessons still remained to be learned.  
Nevertheless, all objectives were quickly achieved and it was hailed by Brereton 
as a “tremendous success.” 
 
The most significant aspects when examining Varsity today revolves around two 
issues.  The first issue is the question of whether or not airborne troops should 
have been used at all.  On the one hand, used properly, there was little doubt 
that airborne troops could achieve tactical and strategic success.  By 1944, any 
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major Allied attack often involved an airborne component and the crossing of the 
Rhine was to prove no exception.  However, it is this mindset that is held to open 
criticism today.  Hastings‟ theory of “airborne divisions existed and consumed 
rations [therefore] they had to be used”82 may be simplistic in outline but might 
contain a great deal of truth.   
 
A salient point is made by Clark when he states that “there is little doubt that … 
the ground forces could have taken the objectives, but Monty did not want to take 
the chance that they would not.”83  It is this point that ultimately has become the 
hub for the majority of Varsity critics, who feel that so many men were lost and 
such effort was expended for a non-essential operation.  They argue that the 
ground forces involved could have achieved the same result, perhaps at a lower 
cost.  Even Brigadier Hill, commanding 3rd Parachute Brigade, had reservations 
about how his troops were to be used on Varsity.  He described, as part of the 
fallout from Arnhem, “the temptation to be overly protective of [airborne] troops 
which, if they are devoid of surprise and audacity, lack a reason for being.”84   
 
The second issue is that “the casualties incurred by the airborne assault were out 
of all proportion to [their] contribution.”85  There is no doubt that the overall 
success of Plunder Varsity was down to the staggering level of preparation, both 
in terms of training and resources, which preceded the crossing.  Airborne troops 
did make a significant contribution to the crossing but the attempt to land gliders 
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before the LZs had been secured was to prove a grave error of judgement, 
something acknowledged in all post-operational reports. 
  
One figure from the past might undoubtedly have said, „I told you so.‟  John 
Rock, the father of much British airborne development in 1940 and 1941, would 
have been horrified at the way 6th Airlanding Brigade was used.  It was a 
complete violation of the principles behind using gliders he had laid down earlier 
in the war.  He had envisaged two roles for glider-borne units, neither of which 
involved large-scale direct assault.  As far as he was concerned, they could 
either be used for specific coup de main attacks, most famously seen at Pegasus 
Bridge on D-Day and at Eben Emael in 1940, or for “the rapid reinforcement of 
ground already taken and held.”86  He expressed this opinion most unequivocally 
when he wrote that direct glider attack in daylight would probably be “about as 
futile as charging the enemy in a fleet of RASC three-tonners.”87   
 
As a result of his death in October 1942, Rock was not privy to the enormous 
developments within airborne forces that had taken place by March 1945.  
Progress had been made, often at great cost, in equipment, concepts and 
experience  Nonetheless, his comments, written over two years previously, were 
borne out by the experience of the glider landings at Varsity.   
 
With varying degrees of amendment, this policy had remained as a central 
concept for glider operations.  At Sicily, the gliders had been protected by 
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darkness.  At Normandy most gliders landed on ground already held.  At 
Arnhem, the gliders of the first lift had landed with almost complete surprise 
(although the gliders of subsequent lifts had an increasingly tough time on 
arrival).  However, at the Rhine, all 6th Airborne‟s gliders were to land in an area 
where it was quite apparent that the Germans were expecting an assault.   
 
One staff officer of IX TCC “had warned that the antiaircraft fire might inflict 
losses such as the command had never before encountered.”88  It was to be a 
prescient fear, particularly concerning those flak guns that were either mobile, 
remained unidentified prior to the commencement of Varsity or were classified as 
light (and therefore fired prodigious amounts of ammunition at the low-flying 
gliders and aircraft).  They were to inflict heavy punishment on the airborne 
troops.   
 
A report on the Varsity landings, written by the senior officer from the Glider Pilot 
Regiment (GPR) present, echoed Rock‟s words and highlighted the suitability of 
gliders for coup de main landings but the unsuitability, even of the new Mark II 
Horsa, of landing non-infantry loads, especially petrol or ammunition, in the midst 
of a contested landing zone.89  Similar opinions were also expressed by Brigadier 
Poett, commanding 5th Parachute Brigade.  In his post action report, he 
commented that “under the condition existing during Op. Varsity, 1 to1½ hours 
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would have been a suitable interval between the arrival of parachute troops and 
gliders.”90 
 
Three other factors compounded these issues into an even more serious state of 
affairs.  First, such had been the scale of losses among glider pilots at Arnhem 
that only 714 pilots of all ranks were left after Market Garden had finished, far 
short of the figure needed for any subsequent airborne operations.  
Consequently some 1,500 pilots from the RAF were transferred as replacement 
glider pilots.  One can only imagine the horror with which many budding bomber 
pilots gazed upon their plywood, engineless aircraft.  Varsity was their baptism of 
fire and although they generally performed well, mistakes were inevitable.   
 
Second, in the weeks prior to the landing, considerable reconnaissance had 
been carried out in order to identify all enemy positions, especially those 
containing flak defences.  Once operations commenced, a combination of Allied 
artillery and medium bombers were used to „soften up‟ all pre-identified enemy 
artillery/flak guns and defences in the area of Plunder Varsity.  What proved to be 
decisive was the number of mobile and previously unrecorded flak positions.  
They were to take a heavy toll on the aerial armada once over the Rhine.   
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Third, the approaching air armada was between six and ten minutes early when 
Varsity commenced.  From such a seemingly irrelevant statistic, a considerable 
effect on events resulted.  An „anti-flak bombardment‟ was programmed to fire on 
all known or suspected position from 0930 to 1000 hours.  That meant it would 
cease firing once the lead aircraft were on the verge of dropping their first waves 
of paratroops.  In reality, the 544 guns firing this task still had a third of their fire 
missions to complete when they were forced to cease firing.  This resulted in the 
“anti-flak bombardment … only [being] effective for the leading waves of aircraft 
… thereafter the enemy could shoot undisturbed.”91   
 
The tragedy that was about to unfold, just as Rock had warned, meant that those 
aircraft least able to contend with flak, the Horsas and Hamilcars, were about to 
get almost all surviving flak defences directed at them.  Unfortunately, most of 
these guns were covering the very landing areas about to be utilised.  Those 
gliders used for coup de main attacks to seize both sides of the road and rail 
bridges over the Issel River were mostly successful.  Other gliders landing 
elsewhere, for the first time tactically rather than en masse92, suffered appalling 
losses and damage - especially the Hamilcars.   Ninety per cent of all 6th 
Airborne‟s gliders that took off crossed the Rhine but “seventy-five per cent of 
[these] were hit by flak or small arms fire.”93  Only eighty eight were later found to 
be undamaged on the LZs.  The combination of smoke, dust (from an Allied 
bombing raid shortly before and the artillery fire), heavy enemy fire and release 
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heights being almost a thousand feet higher than planned, meant many gliders, 
attempting to land in the most difficult of circumstances, either crashed due to 
landing too fast or to the pilots being killed or wounded on approach.  Even when 
landed, as one German soldier recounted, “our 20mm explosive shells had a 
terrible effect on the troops in the gliders, particularly once they stopped.”94   
 
The subsequent losses in equipment carried inside the gliders was so severe 
that it was only the aggressive spirit of many of the airborne troops, the overall 
weakness of the German defences in the face of the concentrated mass of the 
two airborne divisions, the closeness of the advancing troops from 2nd Army and 
the “liberal scale of insurance”95 of extra equipment that prevented even greater 
losses.   
 
In spite of the carnage unleashed on 6th Airborne that day, by 3pm all objectives 
had been taken and troops everywhere were consolidating their positions.  Those 
counterattacks launched by the Germans failed to break the airborne perimeter, 
although one came perilously close to doing so and forced the deliberate 
destruction of a captured bridge.  By eleven o‟clock the following morning, 
elements from 2nd Army had linked up with all units of 6th Airborne.  Even though 
the reality had been extremely bloody, 6th Airborne had fulfilled all expectations. 
  
It is because of this juxtaposition of success and loss that Varsity remains the 
enigma that it does.  On the one hand, it was immensely well planned, 
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completely successful and contributed significantly towards one of the most risky 
of all military operations, an opposed river crossing.  Espousing Fisher‟s famous 
phrase that „moderation in war is imbecility‟, Montgomery made use of the 
overwhelming forces available to him.  Indeed, it is difficult to believe that any of 
the ground forces were anything other than relieved to have airborne troops on 
hand to subdue enemy defences.  
 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the airbornes‟ losses were extremely 
heavy and the river crossing could have been made without their use.  How 
much greater the ground forces‟ losses would have been without their 
involvement remains open to conjecture.  Things had not gone totally to plan and 
many lessons were learned, especially regarding the use of gliders.  Again these 
were discerned at a dreadful price.  However, the losses were not caused by 
stupidity or incompetence.  The error in using gliders as they were was a reaction 
to the events of Arnhem and was the main lesson to emerge from Varsity.  
Likewise, the early arrival of the airborne armada, combined with the non-
detection of so many anti-aircraft guns was a confirmation of Clausewitz‟s 
famous phrase that “war is the province of chance.”   
 
What was undeniable, regardless of any controversy surrounding their use or 
casualties sustained, was that British airborne troops had again demonstrated 






By wars end in August 1945, some seventeen British parachute battalions had 
been raised as well as a myriad number of other airborne combat and support 
formations, without which no airborne battalion, brigade or division could operate.  
All this was a far cry from the original efforts to raise an airborne force in June 
1940.   The battles they fought, particularly at Arnhem, remain a lasting testimony 
to the men who formed their ranks, even if the circumstances and outcomes 
were not always as they envisaged. 
 
The concepts and tactics which airborne forces developed continued to modify 
and evolve as lessons were learned.  Each airborne operation was indelibly 
stamped with the lessons of the preceding one, as Husky influenced D-Day, D-
Day influenced Arnhem and Arnhem influenced events at Hamminkeln.  All 
provided their share of bitter experience and the risks inherent in using airborne 
troops became more than evident during the war. 
 
However, airborne forces offered unparalleled opportunities not available to 
previous commanders.  Field Marshal Alexander, commenting on the concept 
and possible future of airborne forces, wrote that “commanders, throughout 
history, have always been seeking the open flank round which to launch their 
decisive operations.”96  Airborne operations offered them just such an 
opportunity.  They were able to undertake tasks that were simply impossible for 
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other forces.  Their continued establishment in so many armed forces around the 
world is testament to this basic premise.  Alongside such opportunities ran the 
element of great vulnerability.  As Wavell said, “Battles and wars are only won by 
taking risks.”97  In this respect, it was indeed fortunate that Churchill was Prime 
Minister and that the blinkered attitudes of some commanders, especially those 
within the RAF, were not heeded.  It is impossible to say what results might have 
been realised earlier in the war if the RAF had been more cooperative.  In the 
final analysis, British airborne forces lacked a similar aircraft to the German JU-
52 for most of the war and large scale operations only became truly possible with 
the arrival of the Dakota in 1944.  
 
The battle at Arnhem exposed serious flaws in the way in which 1st Airborne 
Division was utilised and the overall concept of Market Garden itself.  One can 
understand the bitterness which many felt, especially towards Montgomery, the 
man ultimately responsible for the battle.  Yet it is also impossible to disagree 
with one former glider pilot, Joe Kitchener, who said simply, “It seemed a good 
idea at the time.”98  The reasoning behind Market Garden was eminently 
admirable.  Had it succeeded, it was indeed highly possible that the war might 
have finished by the end of 1944.  Browning, Brereton and Williams deserved 
much greater censure for the failure than they ever received and the Germans 
much greater praise.   
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Regarding Varsity, it is impossible to agree with Hastings that the operation was 
a „folly‟.  It is Kesselring‟s view which is far more appropriate.  Operation Plunder 
undoubtedly could have gone ahead without an airborne element and it is a 
distinct possibility that fewer losses might have been sustained had it done so.  
Nevertheless, Varsity was a total success in spite of its high price.  Given the 
experience of Arnhem and the dangers of an opposed river crossing, 
Montgomery can hardly be blamed for using overwhelming force.  What can be 
questioned is the manner in which 6th Airlanding Brigade was used.  This was an 
error and one which in all likelihood would not have been repeated had the plans 
for ARENA ever been realised. 
 
In conclusion, Market Garden and Varsity were very different operations and 
debates will no doubt continue to rage about both battles.  What is incontestable 
is that the character and fortitude of airborne forces in the face of considerable 
adversity was displayed to a remarkable degree on both operations.  The „dust 
and sweat and blood‟ may be long gone but the conduct of the airborne troops 
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